Abstract. RFID tags travel between partner sites in a supply chain.
Introduction
Supply chain management is one of the main applications of RFID tags today. Each RFID tag is physically attached to a product to allow product tracking and inventorying. As products travel in a supply chain, their ownership is transferred from one supply chain partner to another, and so is the ownership of their corresponding RFID tags. Tag ownership in this setting is the capability that allows an owner of tag T to authenticate, access, and transfer the ownership of T . Generally, the supply chain partners are reluctant into sharing their private information. Therefore, each partner requires to be the only authorized entity that can interact with tags in his site. To that effect, tags and partners in the supply chain must implement a secure ownership transfer protocol.
A secure ownership transfer protocol should fulfill two main security requirements: 1) mutual authentication between the owner of a tag T (partner in the supply chain) and tag T to tell apart legitimate tags from counterfeits. 2) exclusive ownership: non-authorized parties must not be able to transfer the ownership of tag T without the consent of T 's owner. Furthermore, ownership transfer must be privacy preserving. It must ensure 1) tag backward unlinkability: ownership transfer has to prevent the previous owner of a tag from tracing a tag once he releases its ownership, see Lim and Kwon [12] . 2) tag forward unlinkability: ownership transfer must prevent the new owner of a tag from tracing the tag's past interactions.
In addition to the basic features of tag ownership transfer as previously addressed in [13, 12, 6, 17] , this paper proposes an efficient ownership transfer protocol that also allows a party possessing the right references to verify the issuer of a tag. A possible scenario for issuer verification is a supply chain where partners want to check that a product originates from a trusted partner.
An efficient ownership transfer protocol calls for an efficient authentication protocol. Current RFID authentication schemes based on symmetric cryptographic primitives require at least a logarithmic cost in the number of tags, see Burmester et al. [4] . Previously proposed tag/reader authentication protocols that achieve constant time authentication rely on public key cryptography performed on the tag as in [11] . However, RFID tags are constrained devices that cannot implement asymmetric cryptography.
The above schemes are designed to be privacy preserving against a strong adversary as defined by Juels and Weis [8] , who can continuously eavesdrop on tags' communications. We claim that such an adversary is unrealistic in distributed supply chains which is the targeted setting by ROTIV. In ROTIV, we relax some privacy requirements to achieve mutual authentication in constant time while the tag performs only symmetric cryptographic operations (hash functions).
In ROTIV, a tag T stores in addition to its symmetric key, a public key encryption of its identification information computed by T 's owner. The public key encryption helps the owner to identify the tag T first, then the symmetric key is used to authenticate both T and its current owner. In order to ensure tag privacy, we update T 's state after each successful authentication. Moreover, each tag T in ROTIV is associated with a set of ownership references. T 's ownership references allow T 's owner to authenticate T and to transfer T 's ownership. Finally, to allow tag issuer verification by third parties, a tag T stores an encryption of the issuer's signature. Provided with some trapdoor information from T 's owner( the randomness used to encrypt I's signature), a third party verifier can verify whether the signature stored on T corresponds to a legitimate issuer or not.
In summary, ROTIV's contributions are:
-ownership transfer that ensures both tag forward unlinkability against the tag's new owner and tag backward unlinkability against the tag's previous owner. -a privacy-preserving, and constant time authentication while tags are only required to compute a hash function. -contrary to related work [16, 13, 6, 10] , ROTIV does not require a trusted third party to perform tag ownership transfer. -issuer verification protocol that allows prospective owners of a tag T to check the identity of the party issuing T . -formal definitions of privacy and security requirements of tag ownership transfer. -formal proofs of ROTIV security and privacy.
RFID ownership transfer with issuer verification
An ownership transfer protocol with issuer verification involves the following entities.
Entities
-Tags T i : Each tag is attached to a single item. A tag T i has a re-writable memory representing T i 's current state s (i,j) at time j. Tags can compute hash function G. T denotes the set of legitimate tags T i . -Issuer I: The issuer I initializes tags and attaches each tag T i to a product.
For each tag T i , I creates a set ownership references ref 
RFID ownership transfer with issuer verification
Secure ownership transfer raises four major requirements as follows: 1.) During daily operations, current owner O (Ti,k) of tag T i in the supply chain has to be able to perform a number of mutual authentications with T i .
2.) Eventually, O (Ti,k) has to pass T i to the next owner O (Ti,k+1) in the supply chain. Therefore, O (Ti,k) and O (Ti,k+1) must exchange the ownership references.
3.) Once previous owner O (Ti,k) releases ownership of a tag T i , new owner O (Ti,k+1) must securely update any secrets stored on T i , such that only O (Ti,k+1) is able to authenticate T i and eventually pass T i to the next owner O (Ti,k+2) .
4.) Before accepting tag ownership, a prospective owner O (Ti,k+1) , has to perform issuer verification. That is, upon receipt of T i verification references ref
) is able to verify whether T i has been originally issued by I.
Problem statement
Recently proposed protocols on RFID tag ownership transfer [12, 6, 17] rely on symmetric primitives to perform privacy preserving mutual authentication and secure ownership transfer. As depicted in Figure 1 , a tag T i in these protocols -stores a state s (i,j) = k (i,j) . This state corresponds to a secret key which is shared between T i and T i 's owner O (Ti,k) .
-computes a secure symmetric primitive h that is used to authenticate mutually T i and O (Ti,k) using the secret key k (i,j) . -computes a function f that is used to update the secret key of T i after a successful mutual authentication.
However, such protocols suffer from inherent limitations: 1) Linear complexity: As previously proposed protocols in [12, 17, 10] use symmetric primitives to authenticate a tag T i , an owner has to try all the tags' keys in his database to authenticate T i . Thus, in these schemes the authentication takes a linear time in the number of tags.
2) Denial of service: To ensure forward unlinkability, tag T i updates its key k (i,j) using a secure hash function g even if the authentication with its owner O (Ti,k) is not successful as shown by Ohkubo et al. [14] . Also,
will still be able to authenticate T i even if the authentication fails up to η − 1 times. However, an adversary can query T i up to p > η times, and therefore desynchronize T i and O (Ti,k) .
3) No tag issuer verification: Without tag issuer verification, owners and therewith partners in the supply chain will be able to inject tags that were not issued by trusted parties. We claim that in the real world, the prospective owner of tag T i will require verifying the origin of T i before accepting it.
To cope with these limitations we propose ROTIV. To achieve constant time authentication, a tag T i in ROTIV stores in addition to its symmetric key k (i,j) , an Elgamal ciphertext c (i,j) of T i 's identification information. When T i is queried, it replies with c (i,j) and an HMAC computed using k (i,j) . The owner decrypts c (i,j) and identifies T i . Once T i is identified, the owner authenticates T i through HMAC. Furthermore, to prevent denial of service, a tag in ROTIV does not update its symmetric key unless the authentication is successful. Finally, to provide tag issuer verification, the ciphertext c (i,j) encrypts the signature of T i 's identifier by the issuer.
Note that protocols presented above [12, 6, 17] are designed to be forward privacy preserving against a strong adversary that continuously monitors tags [8, 18, 15] . However, in order to achieve both constant time authentication and denial of service resistance while the tag only computes hash functions, ROTIV must consider a more realistic adversary model. The adversary cannot continuously monitor a tag, i.e., there is at least one communication between the tag and its owner that is unobserved by the adversary.
Hence, ROTIV defines new privacy and security requirements that will be further discussed in Section 5. These requirements are along the same lines as recent research on RFID security such as [8, 18, 15] . Now, we present ROTIV in §4, followed by our privacy and security models in §5.
ROTIV
ROTIV takes place in subgroups of elliptic curves that support bilinear pairings.
Preliminaries
Bilinear pairing Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be groups, such that G 1 and G T have the same prime order q. Pairing e: G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing if:
xy ; 2. e is computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) for any
ROTIV's security and privacy rely on two assumptions.
Definition 1 (BCDH Assumption). Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 and g 2 be a generator of G 2 . We say that the BCDH assumption holds if, given g 1 , g
for random x, y, z ∈ F q , the probability to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) xyz is negligible.
Definition 2 (SXDH Assumption). The SXDH assumption holds if G 1 and G 2 are two groups with the following properties:
1. There exists a bilinear pairing e :
The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is hard in both G 1 and G 2 .
Thus, ROTIV uses bilinear groups where DDH is hard, see Ballard et al. [3] , Ateniese et al. [1, 2] . Such groups can be chosen as specific subgroups of MNT curves. Also, results by Galbraith et al. [7] indicate the high efficiency of such pairings.
ROTIV description
1. Overview In ROTIV, a tag T i stores a state s (i,j) = (k (i,j) , c (i,j) ), where k (i,j) is a key shared with the owner of T i , and c (i,j) is an Elgamal encryption of T i 's identification information.
When an owner O (Ti,k) starts a mutual authentication with T i , T i replies with c (i,j) along with an HMAC computed using T i 's secret key k (i,j) . Upon receipt of c (i,j) , O (Ti,k) uses his Elgamal secret key to decrypt c (i,j) . After decryption, O (Ti,k) checks if the resulting plaintext is in his database D k . If so, O (Ti,k) looks up the symmetric key k (i,j) of tag T i in his database and verifies the HMAC sent by T i . Therefore, ROTIV allows for mutual authentication with tag T i in constant time, while the tag is only required to compute a symmetric primitive, i.e., HMAC.
To perform ownership transfer of tag T i , the current owner
Ti that will be used by O (Ti,k+1) to authenticate himself to T i and to update T i 's state.
In order to ensure T i 's forward and backward privacy, the owner O (Ti,k) of T i updates the ciphertext stored on T i in every authentication he runs with T i , using Elgamal re-encryption mechanisms. Moreoever, T i updates its key k (i,j) after each successful authentication.
Finally, to achieve tag issuer verification, the ciphertext c (i,j) stored on T i encrypts a signature of I on T i 's identifier. To perform issuer verification for tag T i , a verifier V is provided with the ciphertext c (i,j) stored in T i along with some trapdoor information called verification references ref 2. Description A ROTIV system comprises l owners O (Ti,k) and n tags T i . Each tag T i can evaluate a cryptographic hash function G to compute an HMAC. The HMAC is used to authenticate T i and T i 's owner, and to update the symmetric key after each successful authentication.
In the rest of this section we use the notation HMAC k (m, m ) = HMAC k (m||m ), where || denotes concatenation.
Setup
The issuer I outputs (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , g 1 , g 2 , e), where G 1 , G T are subgroups of prime order q, g 1 and g 2 are random generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively, and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing. The issuer chooses x ∈ Z * q and computes g x 2 . I's secret key is sk = x and his public key is pk = g x 2 . For each owner O (Ti,k) I randomly selects α k ∈ Z * q and computes the pair (g
). The system supplies each owner O (Ti,k) with his secret key sk = α k and his public key pk = (g
). All owners know each other's public key.
Tag Initialization
The issuer I initializes a tag T i owned by O (Ti,k) . I picks a random number t i ∈ F q . Using a cryptographic hash function H :
Before accepting the tag, O (Ti,k) reads T i and checks if the ownership references verify the equation: e(H(x i ), g x 2 ) = e(y i , g 2 ). If so, this implies that T i is actually issued by I, that is
Once the owner O (Ti,k) accepts the tag, he overwrites its content. He chooses randomly r (i,1) ∈ F q and computes an Elgamal encryption of y i using his public key g
) sent by T i and gets y i . Using y i , O (Ti,k) identifies T i and starts a hash-based mutual authentication. If the mutual authentication succeeds, both the owner O (Ti,k) and the tag T i update their keys.
1.
To start an authentication with tag T i , the owner O (Ti,k) sends a random nonce N to T i as depicted in Figure 2 .
). This HMAC serves two purposes, it authenticates T i and ensures the integrity of the message sent by T i .
T i replies with (R
Upon receiving T i 's reply, the owner O (Ti,k) decrypts c (i,j) using his secret key α k and gets
chooses a new random number r (i,j+1) ∈ F * q and computes:
If not T i aborts authentication. Otherwise, T i updates its key such that
, N ) and rewrites its state
Fig. 3. Issuer verification in ROTIV
Desynchronization If the last message of the authentication protocol is lost, tag T i will not update its state and therewith, T i will not update its symmetric key k (i,j) . However, as the owner O (Ti,k) keeps both keys k
Issuer verification protocol In order to verify whether a tag T i owned by O (Ti,k) is actually issued by I, a verifier V proceeds as follows:
1. V sends a nonce N to T i , as depicted in Figure 3 .
Upon receiving N , T i replies with
, h
), a random number R (i,j) , and
2. Once V receives T i 's reply, he chooses a random number r v ∈ F * q and computes
When receiving the tuple (N ,
is not willing to run the verification protocol for T i he aborts the verification. Otherwise, O (Ti,k) computes: ref
Given the verification references ref

V
Ti , V checks whether the following equations hold:
Equation (1) verifies whether
Finally, V verifies whether c (i,j) is the encryption of B (i,j) with the public key g 1 by checking if the following equation holds:
Note that if c (i,j) is the encryption of B (i,j) with the public key g
1 , we have: 
The ownership transfer protocol between O (Ti,k) and O (Ti,k+1) for tag T i is as follows:
, who re-sends his first message to 
) and σ (i,j) to T i , and updates its database D k+1 as in the authentication protocol presented above. Upon receiving c (i,j+1) and σ (i,j) , T i authenticates O (Ti,k+1) . If the authentication succeeds T i updates its state accordingly.
Privacy and security models
We assume that the communication channel between owners during an ownership transfer and an owner and a verifier during an issuer verification protocol are secure. That is, an adversary A has only access to the interactions between tags and owners and the wireless interactions between tags and verifiers.
Privacy
Inspired by previous work on ownership transfer [12, 5] , we formally define using experiments the two major privacy requirements for ownership transfer which are tag forward unlinkability and tag backward unlinkability. In the setting of tag ownership transfer, forward unlinkability ensures that when a new owner O (T,k+1) acquires T 's secrets after a successful ownership transfer at time k + 1, he still cannot tell whether T has participated in protocol runs at time t < k + 1.
On the other hand, backward unlinkability, ensures that when a previous owner O (T,k) releases tag's ownership at time k + 1, he still cannot tell whether T is involved in interactions that occured at time t > k + 1.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that the adversary A has access to oracles:
-O T is an oracle that, when queried, randomly returns a tag T from the set of tags T .
-O flip is an oracle that, when queried with two tags T 0 and T 1 , randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and returns T b .
-O O is an oracle that, when queried, returns a randomly selected owner O from the set of legitimate owners O.
Forward unlinkability The forward unlinkability experiment captures the capabilities of adversary A who is allowed to own a tag T at the end of his attack, and who has to decide if T was already involved in previous interactions.
As discussed in Section 3, in order to achieve constant time authentication and denial of service resistance, we assume that there is at least one communication between T and its owner that is un-observed by A.
Our forward unlinkability experiment is indistinguishability based as proposed by Juels and Weis [8] . Adversary A(r, s, t, ) has access to tags in two phases. In the learning phase, as depicted in Algorithm 1, oracle O T gives A two tags T 0 and T 1 that he can eavesdrop on by calling ObserveInteraction(T i ) for a maximum of t times. Note that ObserveInteraction(T i ) eavesdrops on tag T i during mutual authentications, ownership transfer or issuer verification.
In addition to T 0 and T 1 , O T gives A a set of r tags T i . The ownership of T i is then transferred to A through TransferOwnership(T i , O (T i ,k) , A). A is now allowed to run up to s mutual authentication with T i .
In the challenge phase as depicted in Algorithm 2, T 0 and T 1 run once a mutual authentication with their respective owners (cf., RunAuth) outside the range of the adversary A. Then, the oracle O flip queried with the tags T 0 and T 1 , selects randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the tag T b to A. Then, the ownership of tag T b will be transferred to A. Then, A can run up to t mutual authentication with tag T b .
A calls as well oracle O T that supplies him with r tags T i . Then, the ownership of T i is transferred to A, who now can run up to s mutual authentication with T i . Finally, A outputs his guess of the value of b.
A is successful, if his guess of b is correct.
for j := 1 to s do RunAuth(T i , A) end end Algorithm 1: A's forward unlinkability learning phase
Algorithm 2: A's forward unlinkability challenge phase Definition 3 (Forward Unlinkability). ROTIV provides forward unlinkability ⇔ For any adversary A, inequality P r(A is successful) ≤ 1 2 + holds, where is negligible.
Backward unlinkability Note that in scenarios where mutual authentication is required, the notion of backward unlinkability has been proven to be unachievable without tag performing public key cryptography operations, see Paise and Vaudenay [15] . In order to achieve at least a slightly weaker notion of backward unlinkability, we add the assumption that a previous owner O (T,k) of tag T cannot continuously monitor T after releasing T 's ownership. This has been previously suggested by, e.g., Lim and Kwon [12] , Dimitrou [5] .
The backward unlinkability experiment captures the capabilities of an adversary A who releases the ownership of tag T during his attack and has to tell whether T is involved in future protocol transactions.
In the learning phase, cf., Algorithm 3, oracle O T selects randomly two tags T 0 and T 1 . Then, the ownership of these two tags is transferred to A. A is allowed to run up to t mutual authentications with tags T 0 and T 1 .
O T gives A also a set of r tags T i . Then, the ownership of tags T i is transferred to A, who can then perform up to s mutual authentications with tags T i .
At the end of the learning phase, the oracle O O supplies A with two randomly selected owners. A then, releases the ownership of tags T 0 and T 1 .
for j := 1 to t do RunAuth(T0, A); RunAuth(T1, A);
Algorithm 3: A's backward unlinkability learning phase A queries also the oracle O T that supplies A with r tags T i . The ownership of T i is transferred to A, who is allowed to run up to s mutual authentication with T i . Finally, A outputs his guess of the value of b. A is successful, if his guess of b is correct.
Definition 4 (Backward Unlinkability). ROTIV provides backward unlinkability ⇔ For any adversary A, inequality P r(A is successful) ≤ 1 2 + holds, where is negligible.
Security
As ROTIV consists of two main protocols, an ownership transfer protocol and an issuer verification protocol, we introduce the security requirements for each protocol separately. The adversary A in this section is a direct adaptation of the non-narrow destructive adversary by Vaudenay [18] and Paise and Vaudenay [15] to tag ownership transfer in supply chains.
Ownership transfer A secure ownership transfer must assure the following properties: a) Mutual authentication A secure ownership transfer protocol must ensure that, when a tag T runs a successful mutual authentication with owner O, this implies that O is T 's current owner with high probability. Also, when an owner O runs a successful mutual authentication with a tag T , it yields that T is a legitimate tag with high probability.
We define an authentication game in accordance with Lim and Kwon [12] , Vaudenay [18] and Paise and Vaudenay [15] . This game proceeds in two phases. During the learning phase as depicted in Algorithm 5, an adversary A(r, s, t, ) is supplied with a challenge tag T c from oracle O T . A is not allowed to read the internal state of T c . A is allowed to eavesdrop on r mutual authentications between T c and its owner O (Tc,k) , cf., RunAuth(T c , O (Tc,k) ). He can also alter authentications by modifying the messages exchanged between T c and its owner O (Tc,k) , cf., AlterAuth(T c , O (Tc,k) ). A is allowed as well to start s authentications with T c while impersonating O (Tc,k) , (cf., RunAuth(T c , A)). Also he can start t authentications with O (Tc,k) while impersonating T c , cf., RunAuth(A, O (Tc,k) ). A's goal in the challenge phase is either to run a successful mutual authentication with T c , i.e., A succeeds in impersonating O (Tc,k) , or to run a successful mutual authentication with O (Tc,k) , i.e., A succeeds in impersonating T c .
In the challenge phase as depicted in Algorithm 6, A(r, s, t, ) interacts with T c and initiates an authentication protocol run to impersonate O (Tc,k) , cf., RunAuth (T c , A) . At the end of the authentication, T c outputs a bit b Tc , b Tc = 1 if the authentication with A was successful, and b Tc = 0 otherwise.
A can interact as well with O (Tc,k) and initiates an authentication protocol run to impersonate T c , cf., RunAuth (A, O (Tc,k) ). At the end of this authentication, O (Tc,k) outputs a bit b O (Tc ,k) = 1, if the authentication was successful,
Definition 5 (Authentication). ROTIV is secure with regard to authentication ⇔ For any adversary A, inequality P r(A is successful) ≤ holds, where is negligible. In the learning phase as shown in Algorithm 7, the oracle O T supplies A(r, s, t, ) with r tags T i , then, the ownership of tag T i is transferred to A. A can run up to s successful mutual authentications with T i , cf., RunAuth(T i , A). He can as well at the end of the learning phase, transfer the ownership of tag T i to an owner O i selected randomly from the set of owners O. 
Definition 6 (Exclusive ownership)
. ROTIV provides exclusive ownership ⇔ For any adversary A, inequality P r(A is successful) ≤ holds, where is negligible.
Issuer verification The security of issuer verification ensures that when a verifier V outputs that the issuer of tag T is I, it implies that I is the issuer of T with high probability.
An adversary A's goal is to run an issuer verification protocol with V for tag T that was not issued by I, and still V outputs that I is the issuer of T .
In the learning phase, A queries the oracle O T that gives A a total of r random tags T i . The ownership of T i is then transferred to A, cf. TransferOwnership(O (Ti,k) , A, T i ). A can run up to s mutual authentications with tag T i , cf., RunAuth(T c , A). The adversary can also run s issuer verification protocol for tag T i with the verifier V, cf., Verify(T i , A, V) and to transfer T i 's ownership to an owner O i randomly selected from the set of owners O. Algorithm 10: A's issuer verification security challenge phase In the challenge phase, A creates a tag T c ∈ T and write some state s Tc in it. Then, A starts a verification protocol for tag T c with the verifier V, cf., Verify (T c , A, V). Finally, V outputs a bit b = 1, if the issuer verification protocol outputs I, and b = 0 otherwise. A is successful, if b = 1 and s Tc does not correspond to a state of tag T i that was given to A in the learning phase.
Definition 7 (Issuer verification security)
. ROTIV is secure with regard to issuer verification ⇔ For any adversary A, inequality P r(A is successful) ≤ holds, where is negligible.
6 Privacy analysis 6.1 Forward unlinkability Theorem 1 (Forward unlinkability). ROTIV provides forward unlinkability under the SXDH assumption (DDH is hard in both G 1 and G 2 ).
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A(r, s, t, ) who succeeds in the forward unlinkability experiment with a non negligible advantage . We will now construct an adversary A ( 2 ), who uses A as a subroutine, and breaks the DDH assumption in G 1 , therewith contradicting the SXDH assumption.
Let O DDH be an oracle that selects elements α, β ∈ F q . Furthermore, O DDH sets γ = αβ in 50% of the queries or selects a random γ ∈ F q in the remaining 50% of the queries. O DDH returns the tuple (g 1 , g
Rationale The idea of the proof is to build a ROTIV system with an issuer I of public key g x 2 , and an owner O whose public key is g α 1 . the challenge tags T 0 and T 1 stores a ciphertext c (i,j) = (g
), i ∈ {0, 1} in the learning phase. To break DDH, A stores in T b in the challenge phase, a ciphertext c (i,j+1) = (g
). If γ = αβ and A's advantage in breaking ROTIV is non-negligible, A will be able to output a correct guess for b. Therefore, A will be able to break DDH.
. Now, A simulates a complete ROTIV system for A, i.e., issuer I, owners, and tags. However for simplicity, we assume here that all tags in the simulation belong to the same owner O. A issues tags. He randomly selects x ∈ F q . Here, x represents the secret key of the issuer.
1) To issue a tag
Therefore, T i is a tag issued by an issuer with public key g (1) and (2). 2) Valid ownership references ref
-In the learning phase of the forward unlinkability experiment, A simulates O T and gives A two tags T 0 and T 1 . -A can eavesdrop on T 0 and T 1 a total of t times. A provides A with r tags T i . The ownership of tags T i is transferred to A who can run up to s mutual authentications with T i .
-In the challenge phase, A starts authentications outside the range of A with T 0 by sending a nonce N 0 and with T 1 by sending a nonce N 1 . We assume T 0 stores s (0,j) = (k (0,j) , c (0,j) ) and T 1 stores s (1,j) = (k (1,j) , c (1,j) ). -At the end of an authentication, A updates the state of T 0 and T 1 as follows:
). -A simulates O flip and transfers the ownership of T b to A.
-A simulates O T and supplies A with r tags T i . Again, the ownership of tags T i is transferred to A, who is allowed to run up to s mutual authentications with T i . -Given that A does not have access to
cannot give A any information about T b 's past interactions. So, A must focus on ciphertext c (i,j+1) . -At the end of the challenge phase, A outputs his guess of b.
) corresponds to a re-encryption of c (b,j) and therefore to a valid state of tag T b .
Therefore, A can output a correct guess for tag with non negligible advantage .
If γ = αβ, the probability that A can break the DDH is a random guess, i.e., In general, given two events {E 1 , E 2 }, the probability that event E 1 occurs is P r(E 1 ) = P r(E 1 |E 2 ) · P r(E 2 ) + P r(E 1 |E 2 ) · P r(E 2 ).
Let E 1 be the event that A can break DDH, and E 2 is the event that γ = αβ holds. The probability of event E 2 is
, with A's non negligible advantage in breaking forward unlinkability of ROTIV, A 's advantage in breaking DDH in G 1 is also non negligible.
Backward unlinkability
Theorem 2 (Backward unlinkability). ROTIV provides backward unlinkability under the SXDH assumption.
Proof. The idea behind this proof is similar to the proof above. An adversary A can break DDH in G 1 , using an adversary A who breaks ROTIV.
Rationale The idea of the proof is to build a ROTIV system with an issuer I of public key g . If γ = αβ and A's advantage in breaking ROTIV is non-negligible, A will be able to output a correct guess for b. Therefore, A will be able to break DDH.
Construction
. Therefore, from the point of view of A the public key pk = (g
Still, A can successfully simulate O: as A knows the symmetric keys shared with tags, A can compute the HMAC and authenticate tags. A can successfully transfer tags' ownership. Note that for each tag T i A can provide 1) valid verification references: ref
x , A r v ) which verifies equations (1) and (2). 2) Valid ownership references ref
). j) ). -At the end of an authentication, A updates the state of T 0 and T 1 as follows:
. -A simulates O flip and provides A with tag T b .
-A simulates O T and supplies A with r tags T i . Again, the ownership of tags T i is transferred to A, who is allowed to run up to s mutual authentications with If γ = αβ, the probability that A can break the DDH is a random guess, i.e., Before giving the security analysis, we introduce the security properties of HMAC.
HMAC Security A secure HMAC satisfies the two following properties: Proof. To simplify the proof, we assume that the key k shared between tag T i and T i 's owner is not updated after each authentication. As the key update is only required to achieve privacy and exclusive ownership, it is irrelevant for the authentication proof.
We show that if A(r, s, t, ) is able to break the security of the authentication scheme with non-negligible advantage, then we can construct adversary A (p, ) that breaks the resistance to existential forgery of HMAC with non-negligible advantage = .
Let = Tc + O (Tc ,k) such that: Tc is A's advantage in impersonating T c , and
Rationale To break the existential forgery of an HMAC of secret key k, A simulates both the challenge tag T c and the owner of T c called O (Tc,k) , where T c and O (Tc,k) share the secret key k. If A's advantage is non negligible in succeeding in the authentication experiment, A will be able to compute a valid HMAC σ for a message m which he has not seen before. Thus, to break the security of HMAC, A answers with the pair (m, σ).
-A simulates issuer I and creates n tags: 1) A selects randomly x ∈ F q . Here, x will be the secret key of the issuer.
2) A selects randomly t i ∈ F q , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and computes h i = H(t i ). Also, A selects randomly α k ∈ F q and computes : • A simulates T c . When T c receives the first message of the authentication protocol which is a random nonce N j : 1) A generates a random number R j . Let p denotes the probability that A impersonates T c . Hence, A's advantage is: = (1 − p) O (Tc ,k) + p Tc ≤ . Therefore, if A's advantage in breaking ROTIV's security is non-negligible, A will be able to break the existential forgery of HMAC with a non-negligible advantage . This leads to a contradiction under the security of HMAC.
Exclusive ownership
Theorem 4 (Exclusive Ownership). The ownership transfer protocol in RO-TIV provides exclusive ownership under the security of hash function H.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A(r, s, t, ) who succeeds in the exclusive ownership experiment with a non negligible advantage . If so, we can construct an adversary A who breaks the one wayness of H with a non negligible advantage .
One Wayness Let O H be an oracle that, when queried, returns a hash H(t).
A breaks the one wayness of H, if given H(t), he outputs t with non negligible advantage over simple guessing.
Rationale To break the one wayness of H, A queries the oracle O H which returns a hash h c . A creates a tag T c such that s (0,c) = (k (0,c) , c (0,c) ), where
). If A has a non negligible advantage in succeeding in the exclusive ownership transfer, A will be able to transfer the ownership of T c with a non negligible advantage. That is, A outputs valid ownership references for T c , ref
To break H's one wayness, A outputs t n .
Construction
-A simulates the issuer I and creates n tags T i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
1) A selects randomly x ∈ F q . Here x will be the secret key of the issuer.
2) For each tag T i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, A selects randomly t i ∈ F q and computes h i = H(t i ). A selects randomly α k ∈ F q and computes Note that A succeeds in breaking H, if he does not stop the experiment. The probability that A does not stop the experiment corresponds to not choosing T n in the learning phase, and choosing T n in the challenge phase. The probability that A does not choose T n in the learning phase is (1 − 1 n ) r . The probability that A chooses T n in the challenge phase is Proof. Assume there is an adversary A(r, s, ) who breaks the issuer verification protocol with a non negligible advantage , we build an adversary A that uses A to break the BCDH assumption with a non negligible advantage .
BCDH assumption: Given g 1 , g
, the probability to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) xyz is negligible. Let O BCDH be an oracle, when queried selects randomly x, y, z ∈ F q and returns g 1 , g
Rationale If A has a non negligible advantage in succeeding in the issuer verification experiment, A will be able to output valid verification references for a fake tag T c which he creates. That is, ref
where h c is the hash of t c . Therefore, to break the BCDH assumption, A simulates the outputs of H as a random oracle during the issuer verification experiment. When A queries H with T c 's identifier t c , A selects randomly r c ∈ F q and outputs h c = H(t c ) = g zrc 1 .
At the end of the challenge phase, A outputs a valid tuple: ref
Random oracle H On a query H(t), if t has never been queried before, A picks r t ∈ F q and stores the pair (t, r t ) in a table T H . Then, A flips a random coin coin(t) ∈ {0, 1} such that: coin(t) = 1 with probability p, and is equals to 0 with probability 1 − p. To compute H(t), A checks coin(t) : if coin(t) = 0, A looks up r t in T H , and answers H(t) = g rt .
-A first queries O BCDH to receive g 1 , g -A is required to create a new tag T c . Therefore, A selects randomly t c ∈ F q and queries H. To answer this query, A flips a coin coin(t c ), if coin(t c ) = 0, A stops the experiment. Otherwise, A selects randomly r c ∈ F q and answers with h c = (g Note that A succeeds in breaking BCDH if he does not stop this experiment. A does not stop the experiment, if for all the r tags T i in the learning phase, coin(t i ) = 0, and if for tag T c coin(t c ) = 1.
Therefore the probability that A does not stop the experiment is p(1 − p) r . Thus, A 's advantage is:
If is non negligible, so is . This leads to a contradiction under the BCDH assumption.
Related work
Molnar et al. [13] address the problem of ownership transfer in RFID systems by using tag pseudonyms and relying on a trusted third party. Here, the TTP is the only entity than can identify tags. To transfer ownership of tag T , the current owner of T , O (T,k) , and the prospective owner of T , O (T,k+1) , contact the TTP. who then, provides O (T,k+1) with T 's identity. Once the ownership transfer of T takes place, the TTP refuses identity requests from T 's previous owner O (T,k) . However, relying on a TTP is a drawback: in many scenarios, the availability of a trusted third party during tag ownership transfer is probably unrealistic.
Other solutions based on symmetric primitives have been proposed by Lim and Kwon [12] , Fouladgar and Afifi [6] , Song [17] , and Kulseng et al. [10] . These schemes however suffer as discussed in section 2.2 from three major drawbacks: 1.) tag identification and authentication is linear in the number of tags, 2.) desynchronization and 3.) no tag issuer verification.
Kapoor and Piramuthu [9] suggests a two party ownership transfer protocol based on keyed hash functions. In order to provide forward unlinkability, the new owner of tag T , O (T,k+1) does not have access to the key of the previous owner O (T,k+1) . Also, to cope with desynchronization, T 's owner does not update the shared key unless he receives an acknowledgment from T . However, as the scheme relies on symmetric primitives it still suffers from linear time authentication and lack of issuer verification.
Dimitrou [5] proposes a solution to ownership transfer that relies on symmetric cryptography while relaxing the privacy requirements for both backward and forward unlinkability. Unlike previous schemes on ownership transfer, this solution allows an owner of a tag to revert the tag to its original state. This is useful for after sales services where a retailer can recognize a sold tag T . Note that ROTIV offers the same feature: a tag T 's unique identifier will allow any owner to verify whether he owned T before or not.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented ROTIV to address security and privacy issues related to RFID ownership transfer in supply chains. Moreover, ROTIV enables ownership transfer together with issuer verification. Such verification will prevent partners in a supply chain from injecting fake products. ROTIV's main idea is to store a signature of the issuer in tags that can be verified by every partner in the supply chain. Also, to allow for efficient ownership transfer, RO-TIV comprises an efficient, constant time authentication protocol. To guarantee tag privacy, we use re-encryption and key update techniques. Despite the high security and privacy properties, ROTIV is lightweight and requires a tag to only evaluate a hash function.
